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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

LAYNE JEX,

AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLANT
(AMENDED HEARING
TRANSCRIPT CITATIONS)

Appellant/Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 20100674
PRECISION EXCAVATING
and/or OWNERS INSURANCE
CO.,
Appellee/Respondents

JURISDICTION

This appellate review proceeding arises from the Utah Labor Commission's denial
of workers' compensation benefits in Layne Jex's case. The Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(l).
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ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issue No. 1: Whether the Labor Commissioner erred in determining Jex's vehicle
was not an "instiumentality-of-the-business" where Jex shuttled employees to and from a
remote worksite under directions of Precision Excavation; regularly transported tools in his
truck to the worksite; used them at the worksite; and was required to use his truck to run
errands for Precision.
Standard of Review: Questions as to whether the Labor Commissioner properly
applied the facts under the "instrumentality-of-the-business" doctrine in determining
whether an employee was injured in the "course and scope of employment" are subject to a
correction of error standard. Nucor Corp. v. State Tax Comm 'n 832 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah
1992); Cross v. Indus. Comm 'n 824 P.2d 1202 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992).
Preservation of the Issue at the Administrative Agency Proceeding: This issue was
preserved in Petitioner's Motion for Review. (R. at 39-50.)

DETERMINATIVE LAWS

UTAH CONST. Art. I, §7

"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law."

2
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UTAH CONST. Art. II, §11

"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 34A-2-401:

"Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.
(1) an employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured...
by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment,
wherever such injury occurred,... shall be paid:
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury
or death;
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for [medical
expenses]."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Layne Jex was hired by Precision Excavation in St. George as a heavy equipment
operator to work in the St. George area, specifically operating a track hoe. Sometime after
employment began with Precision, Precision took a job some 60 minutes away on the East
side of Cedar City up Cedar Canyon. Precision provided transportation for some of their
employees, but as they did not have enough vehicles, some of the employees were required
to provide their own transportation to the Cedar Canyon job site. Jex, on occasion, was
shuttled by Precision. If there was not enough room in the Precision vehicle he would
take his own truck.
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Precision directed Jex to take one employee to the job site on a routine basis, a
fellow by the name of Nick. Jex did not like Nick personally, had no car-pooling
arrangement with Nick, received no funds from Nick or his employer for transporting
Nick, but solely transported Nick at the direction of his employer. Specifically, Jex was
instructed to pick up Nick at a designated pick up spot in St. George. If Nick did not show
up within 10 minutes of the designated time, Jex was told he was then free to proceed to
Cedar for the morning's work.
In addition to using his truck to transport employees to and from the Cedar Canyon
job site, Jex's truck was used to run errands to and from the job site. Furthermore, Jex
used his own tools from his truck on a regular basis. He had an excavation level he would
use almost daily, hammers, pipe wrenches, crescent wrenches, shovels, chains, a hitch,
tape measure and other hand tools which were used on the job site. He also kept hydraulic
fluid and grease in his vehicle for routine maintenance for the heavy equipment.
Precision's only witness, Trent Holden, Jex's supervisor, testified that Jex would be
required to walk a distance somewhere between 400 and 3,000 yards one way if he wanted
to use Precision's tools or oils rather than his own. This is the manner in which Precision
customarily required the use of Jex's truck.
On the night of the accident, Jex was preparing to leave the Cedar City worksite
when he noticed that another employee did not have his car on the worksite. Jex asked
Holden if he should drive James Irvin back to St. George. Holden told Jex to ask Irvin if
he needed a ride. Thereafter, Jex was transporting Irvin to drop him off at the meeting
•

4
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spot designated by Precision Excavating. Before they arrived at that meeting point, Jex
suffered injuries in a one car rollover.
Because the workers' compensation carrier (hereinafter, "Precision") denied
compensability for the accident based on the "going and coming" rule, Jex filed an
Application for Hearing on August 19, 2008. An evidentiary hearing was held before
Administrative Law Judge Cheryl Luke (the "ALJ") on February 26, 2009 in Parowan,
Utah. (R. at 31.) The parties put on evidence, consisting of the Medical Records Exhibit
and the testimony of Layne Jex and Trent Holden, who testified on behalf of Precision.
(R. at 31 - 32.) On May 28, 2009, the ALJ issued "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order" where she concluded that Jex was not in the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the accident based on the "going and coming" rule since Jex was
"not on the clock" when the accident happened and denied Jex's application for benefits.
Jex timely filed a Motion for Review challenging the ALJ's findings of fact to the
extent they relied on hearsay in violation of the residuum rule. Jex further challenged the
ALJ's conclusions as she failed to consider the nature of Precision's use of Jex's truck as
an instrumentality of the business. On or about July 29, 2010, the Labor Commissioner
filed her "Order Affirming ALJ's Decision" where she adopted the findings of the ALJ and
denied benefits based on the "going and coming" rule without any analysis whatsoever as
to whether Jex's truck was and instrumentality of the business at the time of the accident.
Jex timely filed a Notice of Appeal of the Commissioner's decision and this appeal
follows. For the reasons set forth below, Jex submits that the Commissioner's decision is
5
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inadequate as a matter of law where she failed to consider the actual relationship between
Precision and Jex and Precision's use of Jex's truck in violation of the required analysis set
forth in Moser v. Industrial Commission, 440 P.2d 23 (Utah 1968). As such, Jex
respectfully requests that the Labor Commissioner's decision be reversed and remanded
for consideration of the applicable facts and a reasoned decision as required by Utah law.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Layne William Jex (hereinafter "Jex") worked as a heavy equipment

operator and laborer for Respondent Precision Excavation on the date of the industrial
accident. Jex earned $880.00 per week and worked 50 hours per week. (R. at 32.)1
2.

Jex was hired by Precision Excavation in St. George, Utah and worked on

jobs in that area. During July, 2008, Precision Excavation had a construction project in
Cedar City, Utah. (R. at 32.)
3.

During Jex's employment with Precision Excavating, he carried tools in his

truck to and from job sites which he used to carry out his employment duties. Jex had a
tape measure, a large pipe and crescent wrench that he used to work on some of the
equipment at the job site, a sledge hammer, a homemade "level" device which he had
specifically modified for use on the Cedar City job at his supervisor Trent Holden's

1

In this case, the Labor Commissioner adopted the ALJ's Findings of Fact. As such, the
citations in the Statement of Fact are to the ALJ's Findings of Fact.
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request, and some machinery fluids that belonged to his employer and were used in some
of the equipment that he used at the job site. Jex carried these tools to and from the job site
in Cedar City and had them in his truck on the date of the accident. (R. at 33.)
4.

Trent Holden, Jex's supervisor, was the only witness who testified on behalf

of Respondents, was paid $250.00 for his in Court appearance2. (R. at 32, R. 74 at 108.)
5.

Holden testified that Jex "could have" used tools off the company truck in

order to perform his job. (R. at 34.)
6.

Although the ALJ neglected to mention this, Holden initially testified that in

order for Jex to use the tools off the company truck, Jex would have to walk approximately
3,000 yards. Holden later testified that this distance would be approximately 400 yards.
In other words, Jex would have to walk somewhere between one-quarter and two miles
each way every time he needed to get a tool off the company truck from where he was
working. (R. 74 at 94, 125.)
7.

Jex also had some machinery fluids, such as grease and hydraulic fluid, that

belonged to Precision for his use in maintaining some of Precision's equipment where Jex
was working at the Cedar City worksite. (R. at 33.)

2

The Labor Commissioner fails to make note of this fact. At the time of the hearing the
ALJ indicated that she viewed that as simply a per diem and it was of no import to her.
However, the fact that a lay witness was being compensated to appear in court above the
statutorily mandated witness fees raises serious questions about the reliability of Holden's
testimony and Jex respectfully submits that it was incumbent on the Labor Commissioner
to take that into account in considering the testimony.
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8.

While working on the Cedar Canyon job, Precision Excavating relied on the

use ofJex's truck to run errands, such as going to NAPA Auto Parts store and Wheeler
machinery in Hurricane to get needed parts for Precision Excavating equipment. Holden
testified that he simply did not discuss whether Jex should use the company truck or his
own for those errands. Holden further testified that he was aware the Jex was taking his
own truck to run these errands. (R. at 34, R. 74 at 104 - 105.)
9.

The Cedar City worksite had two Precision trucks, one was a fuel truck

which remained on site and the other was the company truck which Holden drove back and
forth between St. George and Cedar City. (R. 74 at 60 - 61.)
10.

Precision Excavating further relied on the use of Jex's truck when it was used

to move a company compressor from one area to another at the job site because Jex's truck
had a hitch on it (R. at 34.)
11.

Trent Holden undertook the responsibility of providing transportation for

Precision Excavating employees to the Cedar City jobsite. Holden picked employees up
at a designated meeting site and offered transportation on a first-come-first-served basis,
but did not pay them for their travel time to and from the job site. (R. at 32-33.)
12.

Jex met at the designated meeting place for travel to the Cedar City job and

sometimes rode up with Holden in the company truck but drove his own truck the majority
ofthetime.
13.

(R.at32.)
The ALJ's Findings of Fact state, "On occasion, Trent asked the petitioner to

wait a bit longer for a chronically late employee named, Nick. Trent asked the petitioner
8
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to wait an additional ten minutes to see if Nick arrived and then Nick would ride to the job
with petitioner." (R. at 33.)
14.

15.

However, the record provides additional information:
a.

Holden testified that he told Jex to wait for Nick at Precision's
designated meeting spot until five minutes after six before he could go
ahead and leave for the Cedar City worksite. (R. 74 at 124.)

b.

Jex was transporting Nick from the meeting point to the Cedar City
worksite approximately three times per week. (R. 74 at 23 - 24.)

Jex did not know Nick except through work and Nick did not share gas

expenses. (R. at 33.)
16.

In fact, Jex did not like Nick. He transported him because Holden had told

him to. (R. 74 at 24-25.)
17.

Although Holden testified that he indicated that ccthe employees could try

and coordinate with each other to get to the job site," he undertook to arrange
transportation for his employees by furnishing the company truck as a shuttle and
arranging for Jex to transport additional Precision Excavation employees. (R. at 32-33.)
18.

Jex testified that he thought it was a job requirement for him to help with

transporting employees between the meeting spot and the Cedar City worksite, because
Holden told him to transport Nick on a regular, on-going basis and he was required to wait
for at least ten minutes before he could leave Nick, if Nick did not show up. (R. 74 at 52.)

9
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19.

At the end of the workday on July 22, 2008, Jex was preparing to drive back

to St. George from the Cedar City job. He noticed that another Precision Excavation
employee, James Irvin, was still on the worksite. (R. at 33.)
20.

Jex did not know Irvin and had never transported him between St. George

and Cedar City before. (R. 74 at 28 - 29.)
21.

Jex asked Holden whether he should drive Irvin back to St. George. Holden

instructed Jex to see if Irvin needed a ride, which Jex did at which point Irvin rode back to
St. George with Jex. (R. at 33.)
22.

Holden testified that Jex could have opted not to drive Irvin back to St.

George on the day of the accident and that Irvin did not know he had a choice to stay later
at the Cedar City job or go back with Jex. However, Irvin was not present at the hearing
and did not offer testimony concerning the circumstances under which he accepted a ride
back to St. George with Jex. (R. at 33, 31.)3
23.

In offering the hearsay statement of Irvin, Holden first testified that Irvin

came up to Holden the day after the accident to complain about having not been able to stay
on the worksite longer the night before. Although Jex and Irvin had been involved in a
serious truck accident that put Jex in the hospital, Holden testified that Irvin's conversation
the day following the accident was not about the accident, or to ask how Jex was doing, but

3

As discussed in Section B of the Argument, it was improper for the ALJ to rely on the
hearsay statements that "Mr. Irvin did not know he had a choice to stay later." As that was
not supported by a residuum of competent evidence.
10
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<•

only to complain about the circumstances of leaving the worksite with Jex. (R. 74 at 116 118.)
24.

While Jex was returning to St. George on July 22, 2008, his truck rolled,

causing injury to Jex, including fractures at two places in his spine. (R. at 33.)
25.

At the time of the accident, Jex was en route to drop Irvin off at Irvin's

vehicle. (R. 74 at 60.)
26.

On or about May 28, 2009, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law, and Order denying workers' compensation benefits to Jex based on the "going and
coming" rule, concluding the use of Jex's truck and tools did not benefit Precision. (R. at
31-38.)
27.

On or about June 26, 2009, Jex filed a Motion for Review where he

challenged the ALJ's factual findings to the extent that she relied on hearsay statements of
Irvin that were not supported by a residuum of competent evidence. Jex further
challenged the ALJ's conclusion that he was not acting in the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the accident where the ALJ failed to analyze the actual manner
in which Precision used Jex's truck as opposed to Holden's after-the-fact testimony that
Jex "could have" refused to use his truck for transporting employees or bringing his own
tools. Jex argued that the appropriate legal standard required the ALJ to consider the
actual state of the facts rather than speculate about what Jex's employment relationship
"could have" been. Jex argued that based on the ALJ's factual findings the actual
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dealings between Precision and Jex established a customary reliance on Jex's truck. (R. at
39-50.)
28.

On July 29, 2010, Utah Labor Commissioner Sherrie Hayashi issued an

Order Affirming ALJ's Decision adopting the ALJ's Findings of Fact, including those
which were solely based on hearsay, and denying workers' compensation benefits based
solely on the fact that Jex was driving on his way home at the time of the accident and that
he was not paid for that drive time. In so doing, the Labor Commissioner, like the ALJ,
ignored the realities of the employment relationship between Jex and Precision Excavating
based on the largely undisputed evidence presented at the hearing. (R. at 70 - 72.)
29.

It is from the Labor Commissioner's Order Affirming ALJ's Decision to

deny workers' compensation benefits, which Petitioner appeals.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The ALJ's factual findings, which the Commissioner adopted, establish a course of
dealing between Precision and Jex where Precision relied on Jex to use his truck to
transport Precision employees between a designated meeting spot and the worksite, to use
his own tools at the worksite, which he hauled back and forth from the worksite in his
truck, to run errands on company time, and to store company materials for Jex's use on the
worksite. Notwithstanding these findings, the Commissioner denied workers'
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compensation benefits for Jex's accident based solely on the facts that Jex was driving on
his way home from the work site and that he was not paid for that drive time.
Under Moser v. Industrial Comm % 440 P.2d 23 (Utah 1968), the Labor
Commission is required to examine the actual dealings between the employer and
employee concerning the use of an employee's vehicle in considering whether an accident
happened within the course of employment. Indeed, the Moser court reversed a Labor
Commission ruling that applied the "going and coming" rule to deny benefits without
considering the manner in which the employer used Moser's truck. Id.
The fact of the matter is that Precision required the use of Jex's truck when it
undertook to furnish transportation for its employees from a meeting point designated by
Precision to the Cedar City worksite. Precision further required the use of Jex's truck for
the purpose of running errands, having Jex bring his own personal tools to the worksite,
and storing on Jex's truck company materials to maintain company equipment while Jex
was on the job. Under the legal standard established by Moser, it was error for the
Commissioner to reach a decision without engaging in this analysis.
In addition, the purely hearsay testimony which Precision attempted to introduce
that James Irvin did not want to leave the worksite when Jex was leaving on the night of the
accident was not proper for the Commission to consider under the residuum rule. The
ALJ's reliance on this testimony was prejudicial to Jex and violates due process and open
courts under the Utah Constitution. Similarly, it was error for the ALJ to consider as
evidence Holden's testimony as to what Jex "could have" done to not allow Precision to
13
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((

benefit from the use of Jex's truck. As a matter of fact, Holden's own testimony
established that despite what the company "could have done," there was an implicit course
of dealing between Precision and Jex that relied upon the use of Jex' s truck.
Under Utah law, injuries that occur on the way to or coming home from work are
compensable when the transportation is furnished by the employer for the employer's
benefit. State v. Indus. Comrn yn, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984). Moreover, as a general
matter of law, the "going and coming" rule will apply between an employee's home and a
"check-in" point: established by an employer, but once travel commences after that meeting
point. See, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law Section 14.02. In this case, Precision
Excavating undertook to furnish the transportation of its employees from a designated
meeting point to the Cedar City worksite. Precision even made accommodation for a
chronically late employee by directing Jex to wait at that meeting spot for this employee
and instructing Jex that he could leave after he had waited a certain amount of time.
Based on these facts, Precision was furnishing transportation to its worksite and was
relying on the use of Jex's truck to do so. This reliance became customary as the
undisputed evidence showed that Jex drove this late employee to the worksite
approximately three times per week. Moreover, once on the worksite, Precision relied on
Jex to bring his truck so that he could use his own tools closer to the worksite than the tools
on the company truck, which were somewhere between one-quarter and two miles away
from where Jex was working. Precision likewise had Jex run special errands on company
time in Jex's own truck.
14
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«

Under Bailey v. Utah State Indus. Comm % 398 P.2d 545 (Utah 1965), an
employee's vehicle is an instrumentality of the business when that employee is required to
bring his vehicle to work whether it be because his vehicle is transporting tools that the
employee needs or for the use of the vehicle itself. Based on the law and the undisputed
evidence established at the hearing, Jex's vehicle was an instrumentality of Precision's
business both for transporting employees from a designated meeting point to the Cedar
City worksite, but also for bringing tools and supplying company material to allow Jex to
work more efficiently at his worksite rather than walk some distance back and forth to the
company truck every time he needed a tool.
However, because the Commissioner declined to analyze the manner in which
Precision relied on and benefited from the use of Jex's truck, its decision is inadequate as a
matter of law. Moreover, the undisputed evidence based on the actions of the parties
establishes that Jex's truck was indeed an instrumentality of Precision's business and the
Commission should have found that Jex was injured in the course of his employment when
he was transporting a co-employee from the worksite back to the designated meeting spot
at the time of the accident.

15
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ARGUMENT

THE COMMISSIONER'S CONCLUSION THAT JEX WAS "OFF THE CLOCK"
WHEN THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED IS IRRELEVANT BECAUSE JEX'S
TRUCK WAS AN "INSTRUMENTALITY" OF PRECISION'S BUSINESS.

The ALJ and the Commission found that Jex was injured in his own vehicle "off the
clock" when he wrecked his truck. As such, benefits were denied. In reaching such a
simplistic conclusion, the Commission ignored the facts and the law relative to whether
Jex's truck was an instrumentality of Precision's business. The utter disregard of the
relevant facts and law cannot stand.
This case deals with the Labor Commissioner5 s interpretation of what it means to be
acting C4within the course and scope of employment" under Utah's Workers Compensation
Act. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401. Because the Labor Commissioner has not been
granted discretion to interpret this statutory provision, the Labor Commissioner's decision
is reviewed for correction of error. Cross v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 824 P.2d
1202, 1204 (Ut. App. 1992). Moreover, "the workmen's compensation act should be
liberally applied in favor of coverage of the employee in order to effectuate its purposes."
Moser v. Industrial Comm % 440 P.2d 23, 25, fh. 7 (Utah 1968)(citations omitted.)
Jex was injured in an automobile accident while driving a co-worker back to a
meeting spot designated by Precision at the direction of his supervisor. Precision also
relied on Jex's truck to bring his own tools for use on the job and to keep company supplies
16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

such as oil and hydraulic fluid at his disposal.

The Labor Commission declined to

analyze whether Jex's truck was an instrumentality of Precision's business and instead
denied workers' compensation benefits based solely on the fact that Jex was driving home
from work and that he was not "on the clock" for drive time when the accident happened.
Jex respectfully submits that the Commissioner's analysis fails to properly interpret the
law and apply the facts to the law in determining whether Jex was within the course of his
employment.

A.

The Contours of the "Going and Coming" Rule Require the Labor
Commission to Examine Whether Jex's Truck was an Instrumentality
of Precision's Business Based on Precision's Actual Conduct.

The "going and coming" rule stands for the general proposition that an employee's
travel to and from work is not within the course and scope of employment. VanLeeuwen
v. Industrial Comm % 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah App. 1995). The rationale behind the
"going and coming" rule is that the employer does not derive a special benefit from an
employee simply arriving to work and does not exercise control over how the employee
gets to and from work. Cross v. Industrial Comm yn, 824 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Utah App.
1992). However, the "going and coming" rule may not be applied to shield an employer
from liability when he uses an employee's car as an instrumentality of his business.
Moser v. Industrial Comm % 440 P.2d 23 (Utah 1968); Bailey v. Utah State Indus.
Comm 7i., 398 P.2d 545 (Utah 1965).
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Scope-of-employment issues involve a fact-intensive inquiry4. Drake v. Indus.
Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997). The Utah Supreme Court held that the
Commission commits reversible error when it relies on a mechanical application of the
"going and coming" rule to deny benefits without determining what the nature of the
employment was at the time of the accident. Moser at 24. In Moser, the Commission
denied compensability for injuries Moser sustained when his truck caught fire while he was
attempting to start it and drive to work. In that case, the Commission's denial was based
only on the facts that Moser had not begun driving to work and because Moser did not get
paid until he reached his work. Id.
In reversing the Commissioner's denial, the Supreme Court explained, "it is
appropriate to focus attention upon the factual situation and plaintiffs relationship thereto,
just as it existed at the time of his injury," rather than focus solely on whether the
employee was on his way to work. Id. (emphasis added). The court noted that the
employee owned the truck but leased it back to the employer, that he was "on call" to use
the truck at his employer's direction, that he followed the employer's guidelines for
maintenance, reported problems starting the car to his employer, and got injured while

For the sake of clarity, Jex is not challenging the weight or sufficiency of the evidence
relied on by the Labor Commissioner as set forth in the ALJ's Findings of Fact. The
evidence established at trial is largely undisputed, other than the hearsay items discussed in
section B below. The substance of this appeal is that the Labor Commissioner failed to
engage in the legal analysis required under the applicable laws concerning
instrumentalities of the business.
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pouring gasoline into the carburetor according to his employer's instructions. Moser at
24-25.
The court undertook a specific factual analysis concerning how the employer used
the employee's truck overall and did not simply deny benefits because the employee was
on his way to work. This contemplates express agreements as well as those formed
through customary use or course of dealing. The court reasoned, "where an employee is
engaged in activities in carrying on the work of his employer, he is within the scope of his
employment and the mere fact that he may also derive some benefit himself does not
exclude him from coverage." M a t 25.
Likewise the court in Bailey v. Utah State Indus. Comm'/?, 398 P.2d 545 (Utah
1965), held that an employee/owner's car was an instrumentality of the business where he
used it to make emergency calls at all hours, carried tools in it, permitted customers to use
it while their cars were being serviced, and only used his car for work and listed it as a
business asset. Consequently, the court determined that the use of his car benefitted the
employer and that he was therefore acting in the course and scope of his employment when
he died in a car accident while driving to work. Id.
On the other hand, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that a vehicle is not an
instrumentality of the business when the employer takes no part in making travel
arrangements for employees driving to a worksite and has no involvement in car-pool
arrangements between co-workers. Cross v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 824 P.2d
1202 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992)(holding that ride-sharing arranged between co-workers for their
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mutual convenience is not within the control of and does not benefit the employer beyond
arrival at the worksite.). Neither is it sufficient for a vehicle to be merely carrying some
tools used for work when they are not being used on the job. Id. at 1206 (stating that
batteries in the employee's vehicle which were left over from a previous work assignment
do not make the employee's vehicle an instrumentality of the business.) In addition, the
act of simply driving a company car to work, without more, will not relieve an employee
from the effects of the "going and coming" rule. VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm % 901
P.2d281(Ut.Ct.App. 1995).
The common thread in all of these cases is that where an employer involves himself
in an employee's use of his vehicle, whether it be in undertaking the transportation
arrangements for employees, running special errands, or relying on tools used on the job
that are transported in an employee's vehicle, it benefits the employer making vehicle an
instrumentality of the business. The controlling legal authority set forth in Moser requires
the Commission to look at the actual relationship between employer and employee. The
Supreme Court enunciated a legal principle to apply in enquiring into how an employer
actually used an employee's vehicle in the employment. This principle contemplates the
actual situation - whether an employer's use of an employee's vehicle is by express
agreement or as a matter of customary usage. Id.
In this case, the Commissioner failed to analyze Jex's case in terms of how
Precision Excavating relied on the use of Jex' s truck. The only bases for denying
compensability is that Jex was on his way home from work and that he was off the clock.
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In so doing, the Labor Commissioner failed to consider the undisputed evidence that
Precision instructed Jex to wait for a chronically late co-worker to transport him from a
meeting point designated by Precision to the Cedar City worksite approximately three
times per week.
The Commissioner also ignored the undisputed evidence that Jex transported and
used his own tools on the worksite because the tools in the company truck were located
somewhere between lA and 2 miles from where Jex was working. She ignored the
undisputed evidence that Jex had grease and hydraulic fluid in his truck, provided by
Precision, for him to use to maintain and repair equipment while he worked. She ignored
the undisputed evidence that Precision knew Jex was using his own truck to run special
errands during work hours and made no effort to require him to use the company trucks.
Finally, the Commissioner ignored the evidence that Jex was transporting a coworker from
the Cedar City worksite to his car at Precision's designated meeting spot at the time of the
accident. In sum, the Commission ignored in its entirety the manner in which Precision
relied on the use of Jex's truck during his employment. The truth of the matter is that
Jex's truck had become an instrumentality of Precision's business at Precision's invitation
and as a matter of custom. The Labor Commissioner's failure to consider this evidence
makes its decision inadequate as a matter of law. See Moser.
Precision argues that Jex's truck was not an instrumentality of Precision's business
because Jex "could have" refused to shuttle employees to the worksite and "could have"
used Precision's truck to run special errands, and "could have" used the tools on
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Precision's truck. The Labor Commissioner implicitly agreed with this approach when it
adopted the ALJ's findings of fact, which rely on these arguments. However, this is not
the legal standard. The law is quite clear that the Commissioner is required to "focus
attention upon the factual situation and plaintiffs relationship thereto, just as it existed at
the time of his injury." Moser at 24. What "could have" been is not a factual situation.
It is an aspirational one that has no basis in evidence.
The only testimony presented by Precision was from Trent Holden. Holden
testified that he not only told Jex to transport Nick to the worksite on a regular basis, but
that he knew that Jex was using his own tools from his truck and running special errands in
his own truck. Precision tacitly extended the requirement of Jex5 s truck when it did
nothing to dissuade him from understanding and acting otherwise. Indeed, the custom
that Precision expected Jex to help transport co-workers between the worksite and
Precision's designated meeting spot was so ingrained that neither Jex nor Holden thought it
out of the ordinary when Jex asked if he needed to drive James Irvin back to St. George on
the day of the accident. There is no competent evidence on the record to suggest
otherwise. Precision's actions in establishing the customary use of Jex's truck to further
its business purposes cannot be done away with by after-the-fact self serving testimony that
the requirement of Jex's truck "could have" been something different than what it actually
was.
If the analysis becomes one of what "could have happened" as opposed to what "did
happen," the law would be eviscerated. Certainly, Jex "could have" called in sick the day
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of the accident and avoided this horrific tragedy. However, he did not and the accident did
happen. While Jex hypothetically could have refused to transport employees back and
forth; could have refused to use his truck for Precision's errands; and could have refused to
transport and use tools at the job site on a daily basis, the fact is he did not refuse to do
those things. The Commissioner is required to apply the facts to the law, not "what ifs" to
the law. That is rank speculation. The fact of the matter is Precision required Jex to use
his truck for its purposes and benefitted therefrom.

B. The Commission's reliance on unsupported hearsay was error.

While hearsay may be considered in a workers' compensation proceeding, it must be
supported by a residuum of competent evidence. Hackford. V. Industrial Comm >z, 358
P.2d 899 (Utah 1961). In this case, Precision attempted to introduce the hearsay statement
of James Irvin that on the day of the accident, he did not want to leave the worksite with
Jex, but had wanted to work longer. Precision did not call Irvin as a witness or otherwise
present competent evidence to support that proposition. Instead, Precision called Trent
Holden, who was compensated for his appearance in violation of Utah law, to offer up the
hearsay statement purportedly uttered by Irvin.
The reliability problem with this kind of unsubstantiated hearsay is patent. In
introducing this purported statement, Holden testified that Irvin approached Holden the

23
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

day after the accident not to talk about the accident or ask about Jex's condition, but only to
complain that he hadn't wanted to leave work that early.
Notwithstanding the existence of the residuum rule and the obvious reliability problems
with Holden's testimony about what Irvin purportedly said, the ALJ relied on this to find
that Jex arranged his own carpool. There was no legitimate evidentiary basis for the ALJ
to make such a conclusion. This is not a question of weighing of the evidence as there was
no evidence properly before the ALJ to weigh in this respect. Indeed, the ALJ's reliance
on this unsubstantiated hearsay testimony approaches a violation of Jex's rights under the
due process and open courts provisions of the Utah Constitution to be able to question the
witnesses against him. UTAH CONST., Art. I, §7; UTAH CONST., Art. II, § 11.

What is just

as puzzling is the Commissioner's failure to address this at all on Jex's Motion for Review.
Jex respectfully submits that it was improper for the Commission to condone the ALJ's
reliance on unsupported hearsay.
Likewise, Holden's testimony that Jex "could have" refused to use his truck in the
manner Holden had requested and come to expect does not pass evidentiary muster. To be
clear, Precision Excavating did not offer evidence that it actually gave Jex a choice whether
to use his truck to ferry co-employees to and from the Cedar City job, run special errands
while on the clock, or use his truck to bring and use his own tools and store company
supplies. Moreover, the ALJ specifically found that Holden had affirmatively instructed
Jex to wait for and transport at least one Precision employee. Similarly, the ALJ's
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Findings state that Holden never talked to Jex about using his own truck to run company
errands.
Precision Excavating's argument, and the basis of the ALJ's reasoning, is nothing more
than an after-the-fact alternate reality where Jex "could have" used company equipment
and "could have" refused to transport employees. It is questionable whether this would
have been true. Further, this is why customary usage and course of dealing can establish
the parameters of a business relationship as opposed to stated parameters that are clearly
not followed. However, the Labor Commission is not in the business of resolving cases
based on speculation of what the business relationship "could have" been, but on what it
actually was. And the ALJ made factual findings as to what the relationship actually was.
The Labor Commission should have been bound by them rather than deny benefits on the
strength of what the parties'relationship "could have" been.

C. Precision Undertook to Furnish Transportation to the Cedar City Worksite
For Its Employees and Required the Use of Jex's Truck to Do So.

In State v. Indus. Coram % 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court noted
that "injury has been held compensable where transportation was furnished by the
employer to the benefit of the employer." Id. at 1053. Likewise, other jurisdictions have
held that injuries that occur while going to or coming from work to be compensable when
the employer furnishes the transportation, even when the transportation is furnished as a
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matter of custom. See Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Pac. Emplrs. Ins. Co., 2005 Va.
LEXIS 41, P. 1 9 - 2 0 , 611 S.E. 2d 531, 537 (Va. 2005)(holding injury compensable
"where the transportation is furnished by custom to the extent that it is incidental to and
part of the contract of employment; or when it is the result of a continued practice in the
course of the employer's business which is beneficial to both the employer and the
employee."); J.D. Dutton, Inc. v. Industrial Coram 'n, 584 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Ariz. App.
1978)(holding that injury on the way home from work will be compensable even when "an
implied or tacit agreement existed between the employer and employee by which the
employer furnished transportation.")
In addition, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 14.02 notes that many
jurisdictions recognize that injuries during travel to a worksite are compensable after the
employee has left a "check-in" sited designated by the employer. Such is the case here.
With respect to the shuttle arrangements between St. George and Cedar City, the evidence
shows that Precision undertook responsibility for transporting employees, including
provision for the chronically late ones, to and from the job site. Unlike the facts in Cross,
there was no instance of ride sharing that was arranged by Jex and co-employees for their
"mutual convenience." Instead, it was arranged by Precision for the benefit of Precision.
Rather than wait for Nick himself, Holden required Jex to ferry employees to the job
site. He expected Jex to meet at the designated meeting spot and await his instruction rather
than drive directly from his home to the Cedar City job. While Holden maintains that Jex
"could have" opted not to transport co-employees, he testified that he instructed Jex to wait
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for Nick and bring him up, but that he could leave if Nick didn't show up after a certain
time. This is the nature of a job requirement. The Commissioner's characterization that
Holden "suggested" Jex wait for Nick does not comport with the evidence. The
expectation that Jex's truck was subject to Precision's use was so grounded in the
assumptions of the parties that on the night of the accident, Jex asked Holden if he needed
to transport a co-employee back to St. George to which Holden responded by telling Jex to
see if the employee needed a ride. This was not "loose cooperation" of the employees to
arrange their own transportation. It was direction of a supervisor.
Regardless of the circumstances surrounding Irvin's acceptance of a ride back to St.
George, the clear facts are that Jex knew he was expected to transport employees as part of
his job on an ongoing basis. Finally, Jex was not driving straight home, but was
transporting a co-employee back to St. George to the meeting spot designated by Precision.
Although Jex was leaving the Cedar City site, he was going to where Precision directed,
carrying a co-employee with whom he had never car-pooled before at the direction of
Precision. Based on these undisputed facts, it is evident that Precision routinely used
Jex's truck as an instrumentality of its business in furnishing transportation of its
employees. As such, Jex was in the course of his employment when his truck rolled while
he was returning a co-employee to the designated meeting spot at the time of the accident.
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D.

Precision Excavating Routinely Relied On the Use of Jex's Truck for
His Tools, To Run Errands, and To Carry Precision Excavating
Materials to Maintain and Repair Machinery At the Worksite.

With respect to the tools Jex kept in his truck, Precision clearly relied on Jex to park
his truck closer to his worksite for access to tools, not to mention company supplies, which
he used to work on Precision machinery. "[W]hen an employee is required by his
employer to bring his own vehicle to the place of business for use there, the employee is
covered while going to and from work in the vehicle." Bailey v. Utah State. Indus.
Comm % 398 P.2d 545, 546(Utah 1965). In a case similar to Jex's case, the Utah Labor
Commission relied on the Bailey holding to include vehicles that are used to transport tools
which are required to be used in the employment. Ronald Gibson v. IE. Larsen
Construction/Workers Compensation Fund, Labor Commission Case Nos. 01-167 &
03-123, "Order Granting Motion For Review/Order of Remand." There, the Labor
Commissioner observed that when an employer requires an employee to bring his own
tools and drive his own truck for the benefit of the employer, the truck becomes and
instrumentality of the business. Cross stands for the same proposition where it
distinguished that carrying tools in the vehicle had to be tools that were actually being used
on the job at the time of the accident. Cross at 1206.
In contrast to the established legal framework, the ALJ made much of the fact that
Jex "admitted" that using his own tools was a convenience so that he did not have to walk
to the company truck. This is not the legal standard. Moreover, the Commissioner
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ignored the critical undisputed fact that the company truck that contained the tools that Jex
"could have" used was parked between lA and 2 miles away from Jex's work assignment.
The undisputed testimony established that Jex used his own tools on a regular basis. It
also established that Precision kept some of its own materials, such as grease and hydraulic
fluid, in Jex's truck so that Jex could perform maintenance on the equipment at his
worksite as necessary. The legal standard is not whether it was "convenient" for Jex to
use his own tools, but whether the employer relied on and benefitted from Jex's use of his
own tools. Jex respectfully submits that he was required to have his tools more accessible
than 2 miles away and, by its actions, Precision was well aware of this, and obviously
benefitted from it.
Jex was paid by the hour. In theory, he could have walked two miles to the
company truck every time he needed a wrench, oil or equipment. His wage would stay the
same and he would be paid for the hours on the job. However, no work would get done
during these treks to the company truck to the detriment of Precision. The conclusion by
the Commission that the use of Jex's truck and equipment by Jex was a "convenience" to
him is ignorant of the facts. Precision received the benefit of Jex's tools and truck, and
Jex's tools and vehicle were getting worn out to Jex's detriment.
With respect to the special errands Jex ran, Holden testified that he was aware that
Jex was taking his own truck. Holden did not reprimand Jex for doing this. The fact that
Holden simply didn't discuss which truck Jex "could have" taken to run errands and obtain
parts for company equipment goes to Precision's expectation that Jex would use his truck
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to run the errands. This makes sense where Holden testified that Holden's company
issued truck had all of the company tools in it and the other company truck was needed on
the worksite to provide fuel for the equipment. Holden's testimony shows that not only
did Precision expect Jex to use his own truck, but that Precision was not in a position to
send its trucks out on errands and expect employees to continue uninterrupted on the
worksite.
Again, the Commissioner should have considered the actions of the parties in
determining whether the use of Jex's tools and truck for running special errands made Jex's
truck instrumentality of the business. She did not. These facts demonstrate that
Precision routinely relied on the use of Jex's truck on the Cedar City job, derived a
substantial benefit from the use thereof, and exercised control over the use of Jex's truck
while on the job site and in ferrying employees to and from St. George. Indeed, Jex's
truck was an instrumentality of Precision's business. As such, the Commissioner's Order
Affirming the ALJ's Decision should be reversed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Jex respectfully requests that the Order Affirming ALJ's
Decision be reversed and benefits be awarded Jex consistent with the facts and law.
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OilEMMi)
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
PO Box 1840
Parowan, Utah 84761
435-477-1056

LA YNE WILLIAM JEX,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

vs.

Case No. 08-1030

PRECISION EXCAVATING and/or
OWNERS INSURANCE CO,
Respondent.

Judge Cheryl D Luke

HEARING:

2nd Floor Courtroom, Labor Commission, 68 South 100 East, Parowan,
Utah, on February 26, 2009. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Cheryl D Luke, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner, Layne William Jex, was present and represented by his
attorney Aaron Prisbrey Esq.
The respondents Precision Excavating and Owners Insurance Co were
represented by attorney Bret Gardner Esq.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Layne William Jex, filed an Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor
Commission on August 20,2008 and claimed entitlement to the following workers compensation
benefits (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care, and ; (3) temporary total
disability compensation. Mr. Jex's claim for workers compensation benefits arose out of a motor
vehicle accident on July 22,2008. The respondents denied that Mr. Jex's motor vehicle accident
on July 22, 2008 arose out of and in the course of his employment with Precision Excavating.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parties were concerned that relevant medical records from Dixie Regional Medical Center
had not been made part of the record. The Court agreed to keep the medical record exhibit open
for thirty (30) days from the date of the hearing for submission of additional medical records.
No additional records were submitted. A joint medical records exhibit was admitted into
evidence pursuant to Utah Labor Commission Rule R602-2-1 (h).
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Layne William Jex vs. Precision Excavating and/or Owners Insurance Co Case No. 08-1030
Page 2
FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Employment,
At all times relevant to this claim Precision Excavating employed Mr. Jex as a heavy equipment
operator and laborer.
B. Compensation Rate
At the time of the accident in issue, Mr. Jex was not married and had no dependent children. His
wage was $880.00 per week1 and the compensation rate would be $586.00 per week,
C. Temporary Total Disability
The petitioner's claim for temporary total disability benefits ("TTD") is claimed for the period of
July 22, 2008 to October 15? 2008 based on the treating physician's opinion that October 15,
2008 would be a date of medical stabilization.
D. The July 22,2008 Accident and Injuries
No dispute exists that on July 22, 2008 while driving home from a Cedar City, Utah work site to
his home in St. George, Utah Mr. Jex had a tire failure while traveling on the 1-15 freeway and
had a one car rollover vehicle accident. The parties agreed that Mr. Jex injured his low back
with fractures at the LI and L2 level in the July 22, 2008 accident.
E- The July 22,2008 Accident with Respect to Mr- Jex's Employment for Precision
Excavation.
Mr. Jex and Trent Hoiden, Mr. Jex's supervisor on the date of the accident, offered sworn
testimony. Mr. Jex testified that he was hired by Precision Excavation in St. George, Utah and
worked on jobs in that area. Mr. Hoiden testified that there was a down turn in work available in
the St. George area and that the company was going to lay off employees. The company was
able to find a construction project in Cedar City and offered the choice to existing employees to
work on the Cedar City project in lieu of lay-off. Cedar City is approximately a 50 to 60 minute
drive from St. George. Mr. Hoiden indicated that he told employees there would be one shuttle
available using the one truck assigned to Mr. Hoiden and that the seats were on a first come
basis. Mr. Hoiden indicated that there would be no compensation for travel time or gas to and
from the job for those driving their own vehicles.
Mr. Jex testified that he drove his own truck on some days and that sometimes he gave rides to
other employees. He also testified that on occasion he had ridden to the job site in the company
truck ("shuttle"). Mr. Jex testified that he rode with Trent Hoiden about 4 times over a 3-4 week
1

This is based on the week of the injury during which the petitioner was working ten hour days.
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period. Mr. Jex also admitted that he chose to use his own vehicle because there were smokers
in the company truck and he didn't want to be in it He also testified that when he drove his own
truck he waited at a designated meeting site where Trent would pick up employees choosing to
ride in the company truck. Trent would leave with the employees that were ready on time and on
occasion, Trent had asked the petitioner to wait a bit longer for a chronically late employee
named, Nick. Trent asked the petitioner to wait an additional ten minutes to see if Nick arrived
and then Nick would ride to the job with petitioner. Nick was often tardy and this became a
pattern. Petitioner did not know Nick except through work and Nick did not share gas expenses
with petitioner. The company never reimbursed the petitioner for his time or travel.
On the day of the accident the petitioner was leaving the job site and on his way home when the
accident occurred. At the end of the work day Trent Holden was giving petitioner instructions
for the following day and told him he could go ahead and leave. Trent Holden indicated that he
would be working overtime. Petitioner drove down a hill away from the immediate work area
and noticed that a Mustang vehicle belonging to a co-worker was not on site. The petitioner
assumed that Mr. Irvin rode in the company truck. The petitioner assumed that the co-worker,
James Irvin, might need a ride home since Trent was working late. Petitioner went back to his
supervisor, Trent, and asked if he needed to give James a ride home. Trent said, "Yeah go ask
James, if he wants to go now, and give him a ride". Trent Holden testified that James could have
remained on the job working overtime and ride home in the company truck. From the testimony
it seemed clear that the message communicated to James did not include the option to stay on the
job site and continue working. Mr. Holden testified that he had never required Mr. Jex to give a
ride to a fellow employee. When there was no St George work and the Cedar City job came up
the company had indicated that employees could try and coordinate with each other to get to the
job site but it was not a directive.
James left with the petitioner. That was the first time that petitioner had given a ride to James.
They made no stops on the way home and about 40 minutes into the drive the tire came apart and
the vehicle rolled.
The petitioner brought an exhibit of tools that he carried in his truck to and from the job site.
There was a tape measure that he indicated he used "pretty much every day", there was a large
pipe and crescent wrench that he used to work on some of the equipment at the job site, there
was a sledge hammer and also a homemade "level" device that he had modified for use on the
Cedar City job. He also had some machinery fluids that belonged to his employer and were used
in some of the equipment that he used at the job site. Petitioner said that the level had been made
at the request of his supervisor, Trent Holden. The tools were taken to and from the job site in
the petitioner's truck and were in the truck on the date of the accident. The petitioner admitted
on cross examination that it was a convenience to have the tools so that he did not have to walk
back and forth to the company truck which could be parked away from his work assignment. He
further admitted that on the days he rode with Trent he was able to do his job without the tools
from his truck. He also admitted that the tools were also used personally by the petitioner for his
own projects.
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Mr. Hoiden testified that all the tools needed on the job were provided by the employer and Mr.
Jex was not required to bring his own tools. Mr. Hoiden testified that he had never seen Mr.
Jex's homemade level which was patterned after a level provided by a job site engineer which
had at one time been repaired by Mr. Jex.
Mr. Jex gave detailed testimony about two errands he had run for Precision Excavating while on
the Cedar City job. He had gone to a NAPA auto parts store and also to Wheeler machinery to
get needed parts for job equipment. He had not been paid for gas and both errands occurred
during company time so he was on the payroll clock. He had used his own truck to run those
errands. Mr. Hoiden testified that Mr. Jex could have taken the company truck for those errands
and it simply was not discussed at the time. Those errands did not occur ori the date of the
accident at issue in this case.
Mr. Jex also testified that at one time his truck was used to move a company compressor from
one area to another at the job site (his truck had a hitch on it).
On the date and time of the accident Mr. Jex had not been instructed by Mr. Hoiden regarding
what route to take. Mr. Jex was on his way home for the evening having offered to give coworker James Irvin a ride home.
It was not controverted that Mr. Jex was not paid for his time or gas in going to and from the
work site in Cedar City, Utah.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers Compensation Act requires employers and their
insurance carriers to pay medical and disability benefits to employees injured by accident
"arising out of and in the course of employment, wherever such injury occurred...". Mr. Jex
contends he is entitled to benefits because the injuries he suffered in the traffic accident on July
22, 2008, arose out of and in the course of his employment with Precision Excavating.
As a rule, accidents that occur while an employee is traveling to and from work do not
arise out of and in the course of employment and are not compensable under the workers'
compensation system. VanLeeuwen v Industrial Commission, 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah App.
1995). But there are exceptions to this rule. Among the exceptions is the principle that when an
employee is required to bring his or her vehicle to the worksite for the use and benefit of the
employer the vehicle becomes an instrumentality of the employer's work. The employee is
therefore protected by the workers' compensation system while driving the vehicle to and from
work. Bailey v Utah State Industrial Commission, 398 P.2d 545. 547 (Utah 1965 V Whether a
vehicle is "an instrumentality of the employer's work" depends on the facts of the particular
employment relationship.
In a more recent case the Utah Supreme Court commented that in workers compensation
cases an analysis of the benefit of the employees activity to the employer be made noting that the
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purpose of the workers compensation act to alleviate hardship upon workers and their families
requires the application of the act to be liberally construed in favor of the injured worker (see
generally SLC v Labor Commission and Michelle S. Ross, 2007 UT 4, January 12, 2007.
The Utah Supreme Court
further observed that "(s)cope -of- employment issues are in general highly fact-dependent.
Indeed, our prior case law recognizes that 'whether or not the injury arises out of or within the
scope of employment depends upon the particular facts of each case. "'(Citation omitted.) The
inherent difficulty of scope-of employment cases is aggravated when employers and employees
fail to define the terms of the employment relationship before an accident occurs. It is usually
necessary to determine the scope of an employee's employment by reference to actual conduct
and the realities of the work setting.
In this case the petitioner argues that the transportation of co-workers both to and from
the job site, the carrying and use of personal tools at the job site and the two time use of his
vehicle to run a company errand are sufficient to sustain afindingof compensability.
Careful analysis of the facts in this case even when liberally construed in favor of the
petitioner demonstrates otherwise. It was clear when the job was offered that it was the
employee's responsibility to get to and from work (the traditional going and coming). When
there was not work in St. George the employees were given an option of working at the Cedar
City job site. The company would offer to shuttle over workers in the one truck that was assigned
to the job site supervisor. The shuttle was offered on a first come basis and employees were not
going to be paid for travel time or expenses. In VanLeeuwen v Industrial Commission, 901 P. 2d
281, 284 (Utah App. 1995) we find that the general rule of non-compensability has an exception
in situations where the employer provides transportation primarily for the employer's own
benefit and exercises control over the use of that transportation. Under Utah law the major focus
in determining whether or not the general rule should apply in a given case is on the benefit the
employer receives and his control over the conduct of the employee. In this case Mr. Jex made
a choice to drive his own vehicle for his own reasons including not being around smokers. The
employer did not exercise any control over what days Mr. Jex drove, what vehicle he used, what
routes he took to and from work. The loose cooperation between Mr. Jex in offering rides to
other co-workers was not mandated by the employer. On the date of the accident Mr. Jex
offered the ride to his co-worker and his communication with Mr. Holden is best described as
informational communication, not employer instructions. In some cases getting a crew or other
workers to the job might be of benefit to the employer. The trip in question only benefited Mr.
James and Mr. Jex who wanted to travel home from work like any other employee. There is no
indication that had Mr. Jex not offered a ride to Mr. James that Mr. Holder* and Precision
Excavation's work would have been in anyway hindered as Mr. Holden was ready and able to
give Mr. James a ride home. Indeed Mr. Holden testified that he told Mr. Jex to see if Mr. James
wanted to leave or continue working. Mr. Jex botched the message and didn't communicate it in
a way that gave Mr. James the option of working late which may have benefited the employer.
Can Mr. Jex make his car an instrumentality of employment unilaterally? Clearly Mr.
Jex used some of his own tools at the job and carried them in his truck. The convincing evidence
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is that this was not a job requirement, and was not necessary (he worked without problem on the
days he rode with Mr. Holden and did not have access to the tools). The going and coming rule
would be eviscerated if an employee could choose to bring something to work (a favorite pen for
example) and unilaterally overcome the rule.
The third exception that is suggested by petitioner is that he was running a special errand
for the company. They point to the trips to NAPA auto parts and Wheeler machinery and then
try to argue that giving James a ride home is similar. The NAPA and Wheeler errands were on
company time during the work day and certainly if this accident had occurred while coming and
going to get parts on those errands we would not be debating compensability. The accident in
fact occurred off the clock on the employee's way home. This is the traditional coming and
going situation and compensability is not proven*
The major premise of the "going and coming" rule is that it is unfair to impose unlimited
liability on an employer for conduct of its employees over which it has no control and from
which it derives no benefit Cross v Brd. Of Review Indus. Comm'n (Ut Crt App) 824 P.2d
1202.
In this case the petitioner has not proven that he was any different then any other
employee driving to and from a work place and ride-sharing with co-workers as a mutual
convenience, Mr. Jex carried some personal tools that he could and did use at the job site but he
was not required to do so and the company provided all necessary tools at the job site. Lastly
Mr. Jex was on his way home and not under the control, direction or of benefit to his employer at
the time of the accident. There has been no proof that supports a finding in the petitioner's favor
under any exception to the going and coming rule.
I find that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proof that the accident and
injuries suffered in the motor vehicle accident of July 22, 2008 arose out of and in the course of
his employment.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this case is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 38day

of P^\CxSi

, 2009.

~^^,Q\)Xx,
Cheryl D L ^ e
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication Division
of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific basis for
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review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this decision is
signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days
of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the
foregoing review. Such request must be included in. the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
LAYNE WILLIAM JEX,
Petitioner,
ORDER AFFIRMING
ALJ'S DECISION

vs.
PRECISION EXCAVATING and
OWNERS INSURANCE CO.,

j

Case No. 08-1030

Respondents.

Layne William Jex asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge
Luke's denial of Mr. Jex's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Title 34A,
Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated.
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to §63G4-301 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and §34A-2-801(3) of the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Mr. Jex claims workers' compensation benefits for a low-back injury he sustained on July 22,
2008, when he was involved in a rollover accident while driving homefromwork in his truck. Judge
Luke held an evidentiary hearing on the claim and determined that Mr. Jex's injury was not workrelated because it did not occur in the course and scope of his employment. Mr. Jex challenges
Judge Luke's decision by arguing that Mr. Jex's truck was an instrumentality that benefitted
Precision Excavating's business and therefore driving home in his truck falls within the course and
scope of Mr. Jex's employment
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts Judge Luke's findings of fact, which are summarized as follows.
Mr. Jex worked for Precision Excavating as a heavy equipment operator near St. George, Utah.
Precision Excavating was operatmg on a construction site east of Cedar City, Utah, approximately
one hour away from St. George. Because of the distance to the construction site, Precision
Excavating provided shuttle transportation to some of its employees from St. George to the site.
Although Mr. Jex had taken advantage of the group transportation on occasion, he normally drove
his own truck to and from the construction site. Mr. Jex also occasionally ran errands on Precision
Excavating^ behalf with his truck.
On July 22,2008, Mr. Jexfinishedworking and was preparing to go home for the night. Mr.
Jex's supervisor was working late. As Mr. Jex was leaving the construction site, he noticed that a
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certain coworker did not drive to the site that day and might need a ride home because his supervisor
was staying late. Mr. Jex then approached his supervisor to inquire if he should offer his coworker a
ride home. Mr. Jex's supervisor suggested that Mr. Jex ask his coworker if he needed a ride. Mr.
Jex offered his coworker a ride home and he accepted. Mr. Jex and his coworker were traveling
home on 1-15 when one of his truck tires came apart and caused the truck to roll over. Mr. Jex was
treated for low-back injuries following the accident
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Mr. Jex sustained a low-back injury when he was involved in a rollover accident in his truck
on his way home from work. As a general rule, injuries sustained while traveling to and from work
are not covered by the workers' compensation system. See State Tax Comm 'n v. Industrial Coram %
685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984). Mr. Jex argues that this rule, known as the 'going and coming' rule,
does not apply to him because his truck was an instrumentality of the business that provided a benefit
to Precision Excavating.
In VanLeeuwen v. Indusfrial Comm % the Utah Court of Appeals addressed the issue of a
truck as a business instrumentality in connection with the going and coming rule. The court held that
an employee who sustained injuries while driving to work in a company truck was not exempt from
the going and coming rule because the employer did not require him to perform any job-related
service or use the truck as an instrumentality to benefit the business at the time of the accident. 901
P.2d 281,285 (Utah App. 1995). The evidence indicates that Mr. Jex's truck occasionally served to
benefit Precision Excavating's business. However, in order to be exempt from the going and coming
rule, Mr. Jex must show that his truck served as an instrumentality to benefit Precision Excavating's
business at the time of the accident.
Mr. Jex has not shown that his truck was being used to benefit Precision Excavation when the
accident occurred. At the time of the accident, Mr. Jex was traveling home from the construction
site with a coworker, but the evidence indicates that this ridesharing arrangement was out of
convenience and not under Precision Excavating's control. Additionally, Precision Excavating did
not pay Mr. Jex's transportation costs or undertake the responsibility of providing transportation for
him when the accident occurred. The Utah Supreme Court has determined that transportation to and
from a construction site under these conditions does not constitute a significant benefit to an
employer such that the going and coming rule does not apply. Cross v. Bd. ofReview ofIndustrial
Comm% 824 P.2d 1202,1205 (Utah 1992). As a result, the going and coming rule applies to the
claim, and Mr. Jex is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits.

[Intentionally Left Blank]
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ORDER
The Commission affirms Judge Luke's decision of May 28, 2009, in this matter. It is so
ordered.
44^ day of July, 2010.
Dated this Jff

Sherrie Hgyjashi
Utah Labor Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the matter of Layne
William Jex, Case No. 08-1030, was mailed first class postage prepaid t h i s ^ ' day of July, 2010, to
the following:
Layne William Jex
275 E Arrowweed Way
Washington UT 84780
Precision Excavating
PO Box 659
St George UT 84771
Owners Insurance Co
Bruce Lawhun Manager Designated Agent
Box 840
RivertonUT 84065
Aaron Prisbrey Esq
1090 E Tabernacle St
St George UT 84770
Bret Gardner Esq
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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1-14 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 14.02
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law
Copyright 2010, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.
PART 3 COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT: TIME AMD PLACE
CHAPTER 14 JOURNEY ITSELF PART OF SERVICE
1-14 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 14.02
§ 14.02 Distinguishing "Inside" and "Outside" Employees
Occasionally the line between employees having fixed employment time and premises
and those not having them is itself a matter of controversy.1 Some outside and traveling
workers have an identifiable point in time and space where their employment actually
commences. If they are required to check in at a certain place in the morning, the journey
to that place in the morning is not within the course of employment. 2 Thus, a policeman
who checked both in and out of a station house was not covered when he tripped on a
curb on his way home after checking out at night. 3 Similarly, a county employee who
regularly drove his car to a garage, where he picked up a county-owned car, which he
was required to bring to the court house, was held to be outside the course of employment
on the first leg of the journey. 4 On the other hand, a nurse who did not work at the
employer's premises, but who traveled to various patient's homes, did not have a fixed
place of work; her injuries sustained while driving to her first patient's home was
compensable since the travel was an essential part of her work. 5
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 1. For a list of citations by jurisdiction, see 1 4 0 2 D 1 n.l.
Footnote 2. For a list of citations by jurisdiction, see 14*02D*2 n . 2.
Footnote 3. Blackley v. City of Niagara Falls, 284 A.D. 51, 130 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1954).
For cases holding police officers to be in the course of employment during the going
and coming journey, see Ch. 13, § 13.04[5] n.73, above.
Footnote 4. Makal v. Industrial Comm'n, 262 Wis. 215, 54 N.W.2d 905 (1952).
Footnote 5. Jamison v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 955 A.2d 494 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2008). See Ch. 14, § 14.03 below.
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
RONALD GIBSON,

*
*
*
*

Applicant,

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW /
ORDER OF REMAND

*

J E LARSEN CONSTRUCTION and
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*

Case Nos. 01-0167 & 03-0123

*

Ronald Gibson asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge
George's denial of Mr. Gibson's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the
Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Mr. Gibson was injured in a traffic accident on July 27,1999, as he drove his pickup truck to
a Larsen Construction worksite. On February 12, 2001, Mr. Gibson filed an Application For
Hearing with the Commission to compel Larsen Construction and its insurance carrier, the Workers
Compensation Fund ("WCF"), to pay workers' compensation benefits for his injuries. Larsen and
WCF denied liability on the grounds Mr. Gibson's accident and injuries were not work-related.
Judge George conducted an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Gibson's claim on September 18,
2001. On July 31, 2003, Judge George denied the claim, finding that Mr. Gibson's accident and
resulting injuries were not work-related and, therefore, not compensable under Utah's workers'
compensation system.
Mr. Gibson now requests Commission review of Judge George's decision. Specifically, Mr.
Gibson argues that, because his pickup truck was an instrumentality of his work for Larsen, his
accident in that truck was work-related.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission has carefully examined the evidentiary record in this matter and enters the
following findings of fact.
Mr. Gibson owned a concrete business that he operated out of his home west of Cedar City.
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Over the years, he has done concrete work as a subcontractor for Larsen Construction on several
projects. In early 1999, Larsen Construction won a contract for part of the "Millcreek" project in St.
George. Larsen Construction's share of the project included more than $1,000,000 of concrete
work. However, the Millcreek contract required Larsen Construction to perform the work through
employees, rather than subcontractors. For that reason, Larsen Construction hired Mr. Gibson to
supervise its concrete crew. Mr. Gibson had authority to hire and fire employees, establish work
schedules and duties, and direct performance of those duties.
Because Mr. Gibson was already established in the concrete business, he owned tools and
materials necessary for the concrete work at the Millcreek project. He used his own pickup truck to
transport the tools and materials between his home and the construction site. He also used his truck
to transport material purchased from local vendors to the Millcreek site. On some occasions, Larsen
Construction's owner rode with Mr. Gibson to pick up materials. On other occasions, Larsen
Construction employees used Mr. Gibson's truck to pick up materials.
Larsen Construction agreed to pay Mr. Gibson $15 per hour, plus 50% of the company's
profits on the Millcreek concrete work. Larsen Construction also paid Mr. Gibson $100 for gasoline
expense. This compensation package was negotiated between Larsen Construction and Mr. Gibson
to take into account Mr. Gibson's use of his personal vehicle and tools on the Millcreek project.
In traveling between his home and the Millcreek site, Mr. Gibson could choose between two
routes. One route headed west, then south, through Veyo and on to St. George. The other route
headed east to Cedar City, then south to St. George. Travel time and distance were not substantially
different between the two routes. Mr. Gibson preferred the Veyo route, but usually took the Cedar
City route in order to meet with Larsen Construction staff in Cedar City or provide rides to Larsen
Construction's concrete crew.
On July 27, 1999, Mr. Gibson was expecting delivery of cement to the Millcreek site.
Additional forms had to be built before the concrete could be unloaded. Before dawn, Mr. Gibson
loaded supplies into his truck and began driving to the Millcreek site by way of Cedar City. Mr.
Gibson intended to pick up two or three crew members who lived in Cedar City and then pick up
additional materials in St. George.
Three miles from his home, Mr. Gibson collided with an oncoming car. He suffered severe
injuries that give rise to his current claim for benefits.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers Compensation Act requires employers and their
insurance carriers to pay medical and disability benefits to employees injured by accident "arising
out of and in the course of employment, wherever such injury occurred
" Mr. Gibson contends
he is entitled to benefits because the injuries he suffered in the traffic accident of July 27, 1999,
arose out of and in the course of his employment by Larsen Construction.
As a rule, accidents that occur while an employee is traveling to and front work do not arise
out of and in the course of employment and are not compensable under the workers' compensation
system. VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission, 901 P.2d 281,284 (Utah App. 1995). But there are
exceptions to this rule. Among the exceptions is the principle that when an employee is required to
bring his or her vehicle to the worksite for the use and benefit of the employer the vehicle becomes
an instrumentality of the employer's work. The employee is therefore protected by the workers'
compensation system while driving the vehicle to and from work. Bailey v. Utah State Industrial
Commission, 398 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1965). Whether a vehicle is "an instrumentality of the
employer's work" depends on the facts of the particular employment relationship.
The Utah Supreme Court has observed that "(s)cope-of-employment issues are in general
highly fact-dependent. Indeed, our prior case law recognizes that 'whether or not the injury arises
out of or within the scope of employment depends upon the particular facts of each case.'" (Citation
omitted.) Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177,182 (Utah 1997). The inherent difficulty
of scope-of-employment cases is aggravated when employers and employees fail to define the terms
of the employment relationship before an accident occurs. It is usually necessary to determine the
scope of an employee's employment by reference to actual conduct and the realities of the work
setting.
In this case, Larsen Construction granted a large degree of authority to Mr. Gibson with
respect to the concrete work at the Millcreek project. Larsen Construction knew of Mr. Gibson's
expertise in such matters and trusted his judgment, not only with the technical requirements of
concrete work, but also over the logistics of the project. It appears Larsen Construction expected
Mr. Gibson to use his expertise and judgment to marshal the necessary personnel, tools and materials
in order to accomplish Larsen Construction's objectives. It also appears that Larsen Construction
expected Mr. Gibson to use his own tools and equipment, including his pickup truck, to accomplish
the project.
Mr. Gibson's authority and responsibility over the Millcreek project is reflected by the fact
that his compensation was not limited to an hourly wage, but included a right to share in any profits
from the concrete portion of the project. Furthermore, Larsen Construction had actual knowledge of
Mr. Gibson's use of his pickup truck to accomplish Larsen Construction's objectives. For example,
the owner of Larsen Construction sometimes rode in the pickup with Mr. Gibson to obtain supplies
for the Millcreek project. Larsen Construction also paid Mr. Gibson $100 to defray his gasoline
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expense. The Commission takes these facts as establishing Larsen Construction's recognition and
encouragement of Mr. Gibson's use of his truck as an instrument to accomplish Larsen
Construction's work. Because the truck was an instrumentality of Mr. Gibson's work for Larsen
Construction, he was within the course and scope of his employment as he drove the truck on the
morning of July 27, 1999.
Larsen Construction suggests that, even if Mr. Gibson was covered by the Act as he drove to
and from the worksite, he lost that coverage because at the time of his accident he intended to
deviate from the work-related travel in order to pick up his crew members in Cedar City to give
them a ride to the work site.
While the Commission accepts Larsen Construction's general premise that a personal
deviation from work-related travel is not covered by the Act, the specific facts of this case do not
support such a result. Although two routes were available for Mr. Gibson to travel between his
home and the Millcreek site, the evidence does not establish any substantial dijBFerence between them
in terms of distance or travel time. Larsen Construction did not require Mr. Gibson to travel over
one or the other route. In fact, on occasion Larsen Construction required Mr. Gibson to use the
Cedar City route, which is the route on which the accident occurred. Furthermore, at the time of the
accident, Mr. Gibson had not deviated from his work-related travel. Finally, Mr. Gibson's intention
of picking up crew members in Cedar City had the substantial work-related motive of insuring the
concrete crew was at the work site to prepare for the upcoming concrete pour.
In summary, the Commission concludes that Mr. Gibson's pickup truck was an
instrumentality of Larsen Construction's work. It was necessary for Mr. Gibson to drive the pickup
truck to worksite each day. Mr. Gibson's motor vehicle accident on July 27,1999, arose out of and
in the course of that work-related travel. Consequently, Mr. Gibson is entitled to medical and
disability benefits for his injuries as provided by the Act.
The Commission remands this matter to Judge George to determine the nature and amount of
benefits Mr. Gibson is entitled to receive for his injuries. In light of the inordinate length of time
Mr. Gibson has been waiting for resolution of this matter, Judge George is instructed to resolve the
remaining issue with all possible speed.
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The Commission grants Mr. Gibson's motion for review, sets aside Judge George's decision
dated July 31,2003, and substitutes this decision in its place. The Commission remands this matter
to Judge George for further proceedings consistent with this decision. It is so ordered.
Dated this 31st day of March, 2004.

R. Lee Ellertson
Utah Labor Commissioner
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